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Abstract—Practitioners of secure information flow often face a
design challenge: what is the right semantic treatment of leaks
via termination? On the one hand, the potential harm of un-
trusted code calls for strong progress-sensitive security. On the
other hand, when the code is trusted to not aggressively exploit
termination channels, practical concerns, such as permissiveness
of the enforcement, make a case for settling for weaker, progress-
insensitive security. This binary situation, however, provides no
suitable middle point for systems that mix trusted and untrusted
code. This paper connects the two extremes by reframing progress-
insensitivity as a particular form of declassification. Our novel
semantic condition reconciles progress-insensitive security as a
declassification bound on the so-called progress knowledge in an
otherwise progress or timing sensitive setting. We show how the
new condition can be soundly enforced using a mostly standard
information-flow monitor. We believe that the connection estab-
lished in this work will enable other applications of ideas from the
literature on declassification to progress-insensitivity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Progress-insensitive noninterference (PINI) is a popular se-
mantic condition for secure information flow. PINI generalizes
the classical termination-insensitive noninterference to accom-
modate I/O interactions and provides a practical foundation for
many information flow systems. A known downside of PINI
is that it permits leaking arbitrary amounts of information [6].
Malicious code may launder data through termination channels
by unary encoding the information in the length of the trace
or via timing channels. For these reasons, the consensus in the
information flow community is to use PINI for trusted settings,
where the goal is to prevent accidental information leaks. For
untrusted settings, stronger notions of security, such as progress
or timing sensitivity, are necessary.
Many practical scenarios, however, combine both trusted
and untrusted code. Such combinations are natural to browser
mashups, mobile apps, and just about any system that embeds
third-party code. The binary consensus provides no suitable
middle ground here. Progress-insensitivity is too permissive,
whereas progress and timing-sensitivity is too restrictive.
Consider one such example scenario of a mashup that em-
beds a third-party newsfeed widget. The widget downloads the
latest newsfeed from the news server and displays the favorite
topic of the user. The choice of the favorite topic is sensitive and,
therefore, must not leak to the news server. Figure 1 presents
1 function newsWidget ( userFavTopic ) {
2 if ( counter % 10 == 0) {
3 feed = receive ( newsfeed_server_url )
4 }
5 counter ++;
6 newstext = feed [ userFavTopic ]
7 }
Fig. 1. Newsfeed widget code
a pseudo-code for such a widget. The widget implements a
custom caching logic by maintaining a counter and re-fetching
the news on every tenth invocation. For the purpose of this
example, we regard the counter as sensitive as well.
The code in Figure 1 is straightforward and unproblematic.
We can imagine crafting a tool that analyzes (statically or
dynamically) the code in Figure 1 for potential information flow
violations. But if we are to take the next step and try to prove our
tool sound, we hit a semantic conundrum. Because Line 3 con-
tains a potentially blocking network operation, it is unclear how
long it may take for the server to respond, if ever. This means
that if we want our tool to accept programs such as Figure 1, we
cannot use progress and timing-sensitive security as the basis
for soundness. With the binary consensus, the only other option
is progress-insensitive security. This option permits blocking
and divergence,making it suitable for Figure 1. However, it also
forces us to place the termination and timing attacks outside of
the formal threat model, which weakens our tool.
This paper addresses the problem of the binary situation
by presenting a novel semantic definition that connects the
two extremes by reconciling progress-insensitive security as
a particular form of declassification. This reframing means
that we can treat progress-insensitivity just like any other
declassification – a selective weakening of a baseline end-to-
end security policy. It also means that we can transfer insights
about declassification policies, such as their dimensions and
principles [28], to progress-insensitivity. The key to the new
definition is the use of the epistemic approach to information
flow, which allows us to specify a bound on the knowledge the
attacker learns from observing the progress of the computation
in an otherwise progress or timing-sensitive setting.
Two meta-level points about our definition are worth high-
lighting. First, we note that the practice of declassifying ter-
mination leaks by itself is not novel. This idea appears in the000-0-0000-0/00$00.00 © 2020 IEEE
literature as early as two decades ago in Jif [26] in the context of
programming languages and later in HiStar [33] in the context
of operating systems. Here, our work provides a firm theoretical
basis that this practice lacked. In fact, we show that a mostly
standard flow-insensitive dynamic monitor soundly enforces
the new definition.
Second, we stress the value of the epistemic approach in
formulating a concise and intuitive definition. It is not clear
to us whether the definition can be reformulated in a classical
two-trace style while retaining the same degree of clarity. The
discussion of the soundness of our monitor presents an opera-
tional security invariant that does have the classical two-trace
formulation, but that invariant is far from intuitive.
We present our condition in the setting of a simple imperative
language with a standard flow-insensitive dynamic monitor,
which conveys the condition in a clean form. The simple lan-
guage does not contain networking or blocking primitives. This
omission does not remove generality from our setup because
the language already contains the possibility of divergence via
infinite loops. We have implemented the enforcement of this
condition in Troupe – a research programming language with
dynamic information flow control, actor-based concurrency,
and primitives for distributed programming.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II
introduces the formal setting of a small imperative language
we use in this work. The presentation of the security condition
is split across two sections. Section III presents the security
for a progress-sensitive attacker and presents how a mostly
standard dynamic monitor can soundly enforce this condition;
Section IV presents the security condition for a timing-sensitive
attacker. We discuss the definition in Section V and report
on the implementation experience in Section VI. Finally, in
Sections VII and VIII we discuss related work and conclude.
II. THE SECURITY MODEL AND THE LANGUAGE
A. Security model
We assume a standard security lattice L of security levels ℓ,
with distinguished bottom and top levels ⊥ and ⊤, and the
operations for least upper bound ⊔ and the lattice order ⊑.
Our language is a standard imperative language extended
with capability-based declassification, and a special purpose
tini command for bounded progress-insensitivity that we ex-
plain below. Each variable in the program has a fixed security
level lev (x) that does not change throughout the execution. An
attacker associated with a security level ℓ observes updates
to variables with levels up to ℓ; they additionally observe the
reachability of the tini blocks, as we explain below.
In the examples we show here, we use a two or three-level
lattice with levels L,M ,H , where L ⊑ M ⊑ H , and ℓ ⊑ ℓ
for each ℓ ∈ {L,M ,H }. We adopt the convention of using
upper-case letters to denote concrete lattice elements of L and
lower-case letters to denote variables of said level. As such, h1
and h2 are variables such that lev (h1) = lev (h2) = H .
e ::= n | x | e op e | attenuate e to (ℓ, p)
c ::= skip | c; c | while e do c | if e then c else c
| x = e | tiniη to ℓ with e do c
| x = decl e to ℓ with e
| eval e {x1, . . . , xn}
Fig. 2. Syntax of the language
B. The language and the monitoring semantics
Figure 2 presents the syntax of our language. We explain
the formal semantics of the language and then discuss the non-
standard features.
a) Monitoring semantics: For evaluating commands
we use a small-step semantics transition 〈c,m, pc〉 −→α
〈c′,m′, pc′〉, where pc is the security level of the program
counter, and α is the event generated by the step. The events
can be empty events, denoted by ǫ, and assignments and declas-
sifications per the following grammar:
α ::= ǫ | a(x, v) | d(x, ℓ, ℓ) | t¯η(ℓ, ℓ)
The stop and pcdecl commands are only used internally, and
therefore not part of the syntax of the language. Command stop
denotes final configurations that cannot step any further. For
evaluating expressions we use a big-step relation 〈e,m〉 ⇓
〈base; ℓ〉 that relates an expression with a labeled value. La-
beled values 〈base; ℓ〉 consists of a base value and a level,
where ℓ denotes the confidentiality-level of the base value base .
Base values include integers n, strings s, and authority values
auth ℓ p. In our semantics, we denote the base type (integer,
string, or authority) of a base value base as type(base), and
we furthermore assign a predetermined type for each program
variable such that type(x) denotes the type of variable x. The
types of variables are static and cannot be changed during the
execution. Fig. 3 presents the rules for expression evaluation
and Fig. 4 presents the command evaluation rules for our
language. Note how a tini statement reduces to the sequential
composition of its argument and a special pcdecl command.
The syntactic structure imposed by the tini blocks ensures that
the use of pcdecl is always well-bracketed since the pcdecl-
command is not part of the surface language. At runtime,
the expanded pcdecl-commands exhibit a stack-like behavior
reminiscent of pc-stacks in other monitor designs from the
literature.
The monitor is inherently progress-sensitive: barring any
pcdecl commands, the pc never goes down during the execu-
tion. A reader familiar with the literature on information flow
monitors may spot deficiencies in the monitor’s precision – for
example, it rejects program (if h then skip else skip); l = 0.
This simple monitor is picked for the purpose of exposition to
allow us to focus on the presentation of the security condition
and the soundness proof in Section III. We further note that
while it is possible to add extra precision to this monitor, unlike
2
〈base,m〉 ⇓ 〈base;⊥〉
m(x) = base
〈x,m〉 ⇓ 〈base; lev(x)〉
〈e1,m〉 ⇓ 〈base1; ℓ1〉 〈e2,m〉 ⇓ 〈base2; ℓ2〉
type(base1) = type(base2) base = base1 ⊕ base2
〈e1 ⊕ e2,m〉 ⇓ 〈base; ℓ1 ⊔ ℓ2〉
〈e1,m〉 ⇓ 〈auth ℓauth1 p1; ℓ〉
ℓauth2 ⊑ ℓauth1 p2 ≤ p1
〈attenuate e1 to (ℓauth2 , p2),m〉 ⇓ 〈auth ℓauth2 p; ℓ〉
Fig. 3. Semantics of evaluating expressions
progress-insensitive monitors that benefit from hybrid analysis,
it is difficult to avoid pc creep in progress-sensitive monitors.
b) Declassifications: Our language has two different con-
structs for downgrading: one for downgrading values (decl),
and one for downgrading the termination of a region of the
program (tini). We include two constructs to highlight differ-
ences and parallels between the two kinds of declassifications.
Both constructs reveal information by design, but in different
ways. Whereas declassification is a way for the programmer
to indicate that an otherwise secret value is public, the tini
constructs allows the programmer to indicate that a program
block (identified by a unique tag η) should be treated in a
progress-insensitive way, which means that the information
about the termination of the block is public. In the jargon
of information flow control systems, this exactly amounts to
lowering the pc-label at the end of the block.
c) Authority: Our language restricts the use of declassi-
fications via a capability-like mechanism that we refer to as
authority [26]. Given a value at level ℓfrom , an authority of
level ℓauth permits a declassification to level ℓto if ℓfrom ⊑
ℓto ⊔ ℓauth . At run-time, an authority value auth ℓ p consists
of an authority level ℓ and a purpose bit p. The purpose
bit 1 means that the authority can be used for general purpose
declassification, while the purpose bit 0 means that the authority
can only be used for tini-statements. For example, assuming
that variable authM contains the value authM 1, the language
allows the declassification
l = declm to L with authM
but not
l = decl h to L with authM
d) Attenuate and running untrusted code: The only way
to create an authority value in the language is by attenuation of
another authority value. Initially, the special variable rootauth
contains the full authority auth ⊤ 1. Our language contains
primitives for restricting the access, level, and purpose of au-
thority, namely attenuate and eval.
For example, 〈attenuate rootauth to (M, 0),m〉 evaluates to
a value 〈auth M 0;⊥〉 that can only be used for declassifying
progress up to levelM . For running untrusted code, we provide
an eval command that takes a string s and a set of variables
{x1, . . . , xn}. The semantics of eval is, that it parses the string
to a command c (denoted c = parse(s)) under the condition
that c is only allowed to use variables explicitly mentioned in
{x1, . . . , xn} andmust not contain nested evals. In this way, our
eval-command can be seen as a “poor man’s”-scoping, which
we capture in the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 (eval memory safety). Suppose
〈eval e X,m, pc〉 −→∗t 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉. Then it holds for all
s where x ∈ X =⇒ m(x) = s(x) that
〈eval e X, s, pc〉 −→∗t 〈c
′, s′, pc′〉
and
x ∈ X =⇒ m′(x) = s′(x)
Proof. By induction in the program resulting from parse(s)
using that no variables except those occurring inX is used.
The combination of eval and attenuate allows us to attenuate
the root-authority and save it in some variable x, and then
run some untrusted code while only permitting access to the
variable x. For example, we may restrict declassifications in
the evaluation of the command stored in variable mcode up to
levelM as follows.
authM = attenuate rootauth to (M, 1);
eval mcode {authM , l1, l2,m1,m2, h1, h2}
Note that the program in mcode may access high variables h1
and h2 but cannot declassify them since it does not have access
to sufficient authority.
e) tini-blocks: The tini-construct allows us to embed
progress-insensitive code in an otherwise progress-sensitive
setting. To give some intuition about the tini-construct, suppose
we have the following program that loops if a variable of level
H is positive; or makes an assignment at level L otherwise:
while h > 0 do skip
l = 0
This program is acceptable in a progress-insensitive setting,
but is rejected by a progress-sensitive security conditions, since
the assignments to l leaks information about the reachability
of the join-point. The tini construct allows us to embed such
code in a progress-sensitive setting by explicitly declassifying
the reachability of the end of the block. Just like regular de-
classification, the tini-block also requires an authority argument.
Hence, the example above can be written instead as:
tiniη to L with rootauth do
while h > 0 do skip;
l = 0
The design of the tini block is inspired by similar constructs
in large-scale information flow systems: Jif [26] implements
pc-declassification by a single command for declassifying the
pc-label although the syntax does not limit the scope of the
progress that is declassified. HiStar [33] implements a similar
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〈skip,m, pc〉 −→ 〈stop,m, pc〉
〈e,m〉 ⇓ 〈v; ℓe〉 type(x) = type(v) pc ⊔ ℓe ⊑ lev (x)
〈x = e,m, pc〉 −→a(x,v) 〈stop,m[x 7→ v], pc〉
〈c1,m, pc〉 −→α 〈stop,m
′, pc′〉
〈c1; c2,m, pc〉 −→α 〈c2,m
′, pc′〉
〈c1,m, pc
′〉 −→α 〈c
′
1,m
′, pc′〉 c′1 6= stop
〈c1; c2,m, pc〉 −→α 〈c
′
1; c2,m
′, pc′〉
〈e,m〉 ⇓ 〈base; ℓ〉 i =
{
2 if base = 0
1 otherwise
〈if e then c1 else c2,m, pc〉 −→ 〈ci,m, pc ⊔ ℓ〉 〈while e do c,m, pc〉 −→ 〈if e then c;while e do c else skip,m, pc〉
〈eauth ,m〉 ⇓ 〈auth ℓauth 1; ℓ
′〉 〈e,m〉 ⇓ 〈v; ℓfrom〉 type(x) = type(v) ℓ
′ ⊑ pc
ℓto ⊔ pc ⊑ lev (x) ℓfrom ⊑ ℓto ⊔ ℓauth α = d(x, ℓauth , ℓto) m
′ = m[x 7→ v]
〈x = decl e to ℓto with eauth ,m, pc〉 −→α 〈stop,m
′, pc〉
〈e,m〉 ⇓ 〈auth ℓ p; ℓ′〉 p ≥ 0 ℓ′ ⊑ pc pc ⊑ ℓto
〈tiniη to ℓto with e do c,m, pc〉 −→ 〈c; pcdeclη(ℓ, ℓto),m, pc〉
pcfrom ⊑ pcto ⊔ ℓauth α = t¯η(ℓauth , pcto)
〈pcdeclη(ℓauth , pcto),m, pcfrom〉 −→α 〈stop,m, pcto〉
〈e,m〉 ⇓ 〈s; ℓ〉 c = parse(s) vars(c) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xn} eval -free(c)
〈eval e {x1, . . . , xn},m, pc〉 −→ 〈c,m, pc ⊔ ℓ〉
Fig. 4. Monitored operational semantics
thing through “untainting” gates that can be restricted to only
untaint the control flow.
Attenuation of the purpose can be used in conjunction with
eval and the tini block. Revisiting the news widget example
from Section I, the trusted code may evaluate the widget by
passing it access to an attenuated authority. To bring the exam-
ple closer to the language we have presented, we let receive
fetch the untrusted widget code from a network connection and
run it by using eval:
untrustedWidget = receive newsfeed_server_url ;
userFavTopic = ”Politics”;
authNews = attenuate rootauth to (newslev , 0);
tiniη to ⊥ with authNews do
eval untrustedWidget {userFavTopic}
III. SECURITY CONDITION
This section presents a security definition for embedding tini-
blocks when the baseline security is progress-sensitive.
A. Auxiliary definitions
We use the knowledge-based [5] approach to define our
security condition. In the following we write ⌊t⌋ℓ to denote a
filtering of the trace t that only includes the events that are
observable at level ℓ as defined in Definition 2, and we write
m ∼ℓ s to denote that two memories are equal up to ℓ defined
by Definition 1.
Definition 1 (Memory equivalence). Two memories m and s
are equivalent up to level ℓ, written m ∼ℓ s, if dom(m) =
dom(s) and it holds that for all x ∈ dom(m),
lev(x) ⊑ ℓ =⇒ m(x) = s(x)
We define level of an event, denoted lev(α), as the level of
the updated variable for assignment and declassify events, level
ℓto for tini events t¯η(ℓ, ℓto), and ⊤ otherwise:
lev (ǫ) = ⊤
lev(a(x, _)) = lev(x)
lev(d(x, _, _) |) = lev(x)
lev (t¯η(_, ℓto)) = ℓto
Definition 2 (Trace filtering). The filtering of a trace t at level
ℓ written ⌊t⌋ℓ is defined as
⌊[]⌋ℓ = []
⌊t′ · α⌋ℓ =
{
⌊t′⌋ℓ · α if lev (α) ⊑ ℓ
⌊t′⌋ℓ otherwise
We use the above to define two technical definitions of
knowledge:
Definition 3 (Attacker knowledge [3]). Given a program c,
initial memory m, initial program counter level pc, such that
〈c,m, pc〉 −→∗t 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉, define attacker knowledge at
level ℓadv to be the set of memoriesm
′ that are consistent with
the observations of the adversary:
k(c,m, t, ℓadv) , {m
′ | m ∼ℓadv m
′∧
〈c,m′, pc〉 −→∗t′ 〈c
′′,m′′, pc′′〉 ∧ ⌊t′⌋ℓadv = ⌊t⌋ℓadv}
Definition 4 (Progress knowledge [4]). Given a program c,
initial memory m, initial program counter level pc, such that
〈c,m, pc〉 −→∗t 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉, define progress knowledge at
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level ℓadv to be the set of memoriesm
′ that are consistent with
the knowledge up to t followed further by one more event:
k→(c,m, t, ℓadv) , {m
′ | m ∼ℓadv m
′∧
〈c,m′, pc〉 −→∗t′ 〈c
′′,m′′, pc′′〉 ∧ ⌊t′⌋ℓadv = ⌊t⌋ℓadv · α}
B. Progress-sensitive security with declassification and locally-
bound progress-insensitivity
Armed with the above definitions, we define our main secu-
rity condition as follows.
Definition 5 (Progress-sensitive security with declassification
and locally-bound progress-insensitivity). Given a program c,
initial memory m and initial program counter label pc such
that
〈c,m, pc〉 −→∗t·α 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉
define the run as secure if it holds that for all ℓadv , if lev(α) ⊑
ℓadv then
1) if α = d(_, ℓauth , ℓto) then it should hold that:
a) k→(c,m, t, ℓadv) ⊇ k(c,m, t, ℓadv ), and
b) k(c,m, t · α, ℓadv ) ⊇ k(c,m, t, ℓto ⊔ ℓauth)
2) if α = t¯η(ℓauth , ℓto) then it should hold that:
a) k(c,m, t · α, ℓadv ) ⊇ k→(c,m, t, ℓadv )
b) k→(c,m, t, ℓadv) ⊇ k(c,m, t, ℓto ⊔ ℓauth)
3) otherwise, it should hold that:
k(c,m, t · α, ℓadv ) ⊇ k(c,m, t, ℓadv)
The security condition specifies what information the at-
tacker may learn from observing the program events. The
baseline progress-sensitive security is captured in item 3 of
the definition stating that the attacker learns nothing from non-
declassify events. This rules out many standard examples of
direct and indirect flows, as well as the termination leaks such
as
l = 0; (while h > 0 do skip); l = 1
The other two items weaken the baseline as follows. For
declassifications (item 1) we have two clauses: Clause 1a says
that reachability of the declassification conveys no knowledge
to the attacker. Observe that this is expressed as a bound on the
progress knowledge! This clause rules out programs such as
l = 0; (while h > 0 do skip); l = decl h to L with authH
that leak via termination without a tini-statement.
Clause 1b specifies an upper bound on the information the
attacker learns from the event to be no more the knowledge
at level ℓto ⊔ ℓauth before the event. This clause has a flavor
of language-based intransitive noninterference [21], because it
does not otherwise bound what information from the permitted
level is declassified. For example, assuming authM and authH
are authorities with purpose bit one, this definition accepts the
program
m = decl h toM with authH ;
l = declm to L with authM
Both declassifications above are allowed. At the time of the sec-
ond declassification, the adversary at L learns the original value
of h despite only using the authority of M . This is accepted
because the earlier declassification of h to m happened with
sufficient authority.
Clause 1b does not regulate exactly what information from
the level of ℓto⊔ℓauth may be declassified; however, prior work
on using knowledge-based conditions for further constraining
what and where to declassify can be easily applied here in an
orthogonal manner [4], [14].
For tini-events (item 2), we also have two constraints. The
first constraint corresponds to standard progress-insensitive
noninterference [6]: knowledge of the event must reveal no
more than knowledge of the event’s existence. The second
constraint is interesting, because it specifies an upper bound
on the information leaked by the termination to be no more
than the knowledge at level ℓto ⊔ ℓauth before the event. This
is again expressed as a bound on progress knowledge. This
clause rules out programs with insufficient authority for the pc-
declassification such as
l = 0; (tiniη to L with authM do while h > 0 do skip); l = 1
The definition accepts programs that use tini blocks as long
as the authority for the pc-declassification is sufficient. This
includes nested tini blocks. The following program is accepted.
l = 0;
tiniη1 to L with authM do {
if m > 0 then
tiniη2 toM with authH do
while h > 0 do skip
else skip };
l = 1
C. A note on the design of item 2
For the simple language of this section, the two clauses of
item 2 can be simplified to require that for α = t¯η(ℓauth , ℓto) it
must hold that
k(c,m, t · α, ℓadv ) ⊇ k(c,m, t, ℓto ⊔ ℓauth)
We opted to present the definition without this simplification,
because in more realistic settings, this simplification is danger-
ous and leads to occlusion.
The simplification is possible in our language, because
pcdecl events are attacker-observable and convey little infor-
mation other than their reachability, thanks to syntactically
enforced well-bracketedness of tini/pcdecl commands.1
However, in reality, it may be unfair to assume that attacker
observes internal events such as pcdecl. Suppose indeed that
pcdecl has no manifestation in the attacker-observable projec-
tion of the trace. How would we need to change Definition 5
to accommodate this? One option is to rephrase item 2 of
Definition 5 so that event α refers to the first observable event
1These conveniences help us minimize technical clutter in the paper.
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cfg −→α cfg
′ lev (α) ⊑ ℓ
cfg y0,ℓα cfg
′
cfg −→β 〈stop,m, pc〉 lev (β) 6⊑ ℓ
cfg y
0,ℓ
β 〈stop,m, pc〉
cfg1 −→β cfg2 lev (β) 6⊑ ℓ cfg2 y
n,ℓ
α cfg3
cfg1 y
n+1,ℓ
α cfg3
Fig. 5. Bridge-step relation
after executing pcdecl. But such events can communicate more
than a unit of information, as in the program below.
tini to L with rootauth do {skip}
if h > 0 then l = 0 else l = 1
This program would reduce to
pcdecl(rootauth, L); if h > 0 then l = 0 else l = 1
Here, the first event after pcdecl is one of the low assignments.
The approach of the simplified definition accepts this program
because it mistakenly applies the declassification condition to
reveal the choice of the high branch. On the other hand, the
two-clause approach that explicitly constraints the progress
knowledge rejects this program.
D. Soundness of the enforcement
Next, we formally connect the monitoring semantics of Sec-
tion II with Definition 5. We do this by showing the following
statement:
Theorem 1 (Soundness of the monitoring semantics). Given
a program c, memory m, and level pc then all runs
〈c,m, pc〉 −→∗t 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉 satisfy Definition 5
To get some intuition about the proof, let us think how classi-
cal noninterference proofs usually proceed. The security invari-
ant of such proofs boils down to the reasoning along the lines of
“a pair of low-equivalent configurations that each emit attacker-
observable events transition to low-equivalent configurations
plus the attacker cannot discriminate between the two events.”
Note how low-equivalence is used in both the precondition
and the post-condition of such a statement. For declassification,
we need to weaken the invariant, which is typically done by
strengthening the precondition to relate fewer configurations.
Set-theoretically, this strengthening corresponds to picking a
relation that is smaller than low-equivalence. Exactly how small
is an important design criterion that is dictated by the top-level
security requirement such as our Definition 5. One challenge
that we have encountered in the proof is finding the right
equivalence relation for the precondition that is compositional
in the applications of the inductive hypothesis. Our solution to
this challenge is engineer relations that are smaller than low-
equivalence, subject to additional constraints we explain below.
〈c,m, pc〉yn,ℓα 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉 〈c, s, pc〉yn
′,ℓ
α 〈c
′, s′, pc′〉
〈c,m | s, pc〉 ⇒ℓα 〈c
′,m′ | s′, pc′〉
k > 1 〈c,m | s, pc〉 ⇒ℓα1 〈c
′,m′ | s′, pc′〉
〈c′,m′ | s′, pc′〉 ⇒ℓα2...αk 〈c
′′,m′′ | s′′, pc′′〉
〈c,m | s, pc〉 ⇒ℓα1...αk 〈c
′′,m′′ | s′′, pc′′〉
Fig. 6. Synchronized bridging
First, we define an auxiliary relation that characterizes the in-
tuition of “configuration emitting an attacker-observable event.”
We call this relation bridge-step. Operationally it is defined as
a relation between two configurations where the first configu-
ration reaches the second one by taking n intermediate “secret”
steps (without producing any observable events) and then either
emits an observable step or terminates. This relation is shown
in Fig. 5. The security intuition behind the bridge relation is
that the attacker only observes the configurations related by
the bridge relation. Hence, we formulate our security invariant
around that relation.
We furthermore define indistinguishability restriction
〈I〉
c,pc
ℓ|α1...αk
as the restriction of the relation I to only contain
all pairs of the memories that can emit α1 . . . αk (in that
order) when evaluating c using initial program-counter pc. To
formally define 〈I〉
c,pc
ℓ|α1...αk
, we introduce another auxiliary
definition that synchronizes two bridge-step runs on a list of
events. The synchronized bridge has the effect of demanding
that two runs proceed in lock-step w.r.t to their individual
bridge-steps. The rules for synchronized bridging can be seen
in Fig. 6.
We can now define indistinguishability restriction as per
Definition 6 below.
Definition 6 (Indistinguishability restriction 〈I〉
c,pc
ℓ|α ). Consider
a potentially empty sequence of events α1 . . . αk. Define the
relationm 〈I〉c,pc
ℓ|α1...αk
s as follows:
m I s
m 〈I〉
c,pc
ℓ|nil s
m I s 〈c,m | s, pc〉 ⇒ℓα1...αk 〈c
′,m′ | s′, pc′′〉
m 〈I〉
c,pc
ℓ|α1...αk
s
With all this auxiliary infrastructure, we now state the opera-
tional definition of security.
Lemma 2 (Security for monitored evaluations). Suppose
〈c,m, pc〉yn,ℓα 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉. Then the following holds:
1) if α = d(x, ℓauth , ℓto) and lev (x) ⊑ ℓ:
Let
I =〈∼ℓauth⊔ℓto 〉
c,pc
ℓauth⊔ℓto|β1,...,βj
where
〈c,m, pc〉yi1,ℓauth⊔ℓtoβ1 〈c1,m1, pc1〉y
i2,ℓauth⊔ℓto
β2
. . . y
ij ,ℓauth⊔ℓto
βj
〈cj ,mj, pcj〉
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such that
〈cj ,mj, pcj〉y
i′,ℓauth⊔ℓto
α 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉
then it holds that for all s such thatm I s,
〈c, s, pc〉yn
′,ℓ
α 〈c
′, s′, pc′〉
andm′ ∼ℓ s
′.
2) if α = t¯η(ℓauth , ℓto) and ℓto ⊑ ℓ:
Let
I =〈∼ℓauth⊔ℓto 〉
c,pc
ℓauth⊔ℓto |β1,...,βj
where
〈c,m, pc〉yi1,ℓauth⊔ℓtoβ1 〈c1,m1, pc1〉y
i2,ℓauth⊔ℓto
β2
. . . y
ik,ℓauth⊔ℓto
βj
〈cj ,mj , pcj〉
such that
〈cj ,mj, pcj〉y
i′,ℓauth⊔ℓto
α 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉
then it must hold that for all s wherem I s there exists α′
such that
〈c, s, pc〉yn
′,ℓ
α′ 〈c
′, s′, pc′〉
andm′ ∼ℓ s
′.
3) if α 6= t¯_(_, _) and pc
′ ⊑ ℓ:
For all s wherem ∼ℓ s it holds that
〈c, s, pc〉yn
′,ℓ
α 〈c
′, s′, pc′〉
and if α is not a declassify event d(x, _, _) where lev (x) ⊑
ℓ thenm′ ∼ℓ s
′.
4) if α = t¯η(_, _) or pc
′ 6⊑ ℓ:
It holds that for all s wherem ∼ℓ s,
〈c, s, pc〉yn
′,ℓ
α′ 〈c
′′, s′, pc′′〉 =⇒
m′ ∼ℓ s
′ ∧ c′ = c′′
∧ pc′ 6⊑ ℓ =⇒ (pc′′ 6⊑ ℓ ∧ c′ = stop)
∧ pc′ ⊑ ℓ =⇒ (pc′′ ⊑ ℓ ∧ α = α′)
The indistinguishability restriction of ∼ℓ, which we alluded
to earlier, appears in two out of four sub-cases of the invariant.
This is crucial in the proof when showing the clauses related to
declassify-events, since this allows us to account for earlier un-
observable declassifies that might become observable through
the latest event. For example, suppose we have an attacker at
level L and that we earlier on declassified a value v from H
to M . Now if we later declassify that same value from M to
L, it is not enough to only assume that the initial memories
satisfy memory-equivalence up to M to prove the clause for
declassify. Instead, we “replay” the trace at a higher attacker-
level – in this case M – which reveals the events that are
otherwise only observable at this higher level – such as declassi-
fications fromH toM . We use these events to synchronize the
memories, and then conclude that the two runs must declassify
the same value. This is exactly what the indistinguishability
restriction condition 〈∼ℓauth⊔ℓto 〉
c,pc
ℓauth⊔ℓto |α1,...,αk
provides. The
events α1, . . . , αk here range over theM -level events including
H to M declassifications; none of these events are typically
observable by L.
The detailed proof of Lemma 2 can be found in the Appendix,
where we also prove that runs satisfying Lemma 2 satisfy
Definition 5.
IV. TIMING SENSITIVITY
The security condition that we present for progress-sensitive
noninterference in Definition 5 can be naturally strengthened
to also cover timing-sensitive noninterference. The cautious
readermight have noticed already that the monitor we present in
our language is actually already enforcing this stronger notion
of noninterference. As an example, the program
if h > 0
then skip
else skip; skip; skip;
l = 0
is accepted by our progress-sensitive security condition, but is
not allowed by our monitor. This shows that our monitoring
leaves room for strengthening the security condition so that
examples like above are also rejected by the definition.
To formalize this observation, we add a clock ts to our
configurations 〈c,m, pc | ts〉 and timestamps to events (ts , α)
such that our evaluation steps are now defined by the following
rule
〈c,m, pc〉 −→α 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉
〈c,m, pc | ts〉 −→(ts+1,α) 〈c
′,m′, pc′ | ts + 1〉
We extend the definition of when events are observable in
the obvious way: a timestamped event (ts, α) is observable at
level ℓ if α is observable at level ℓ. The definitions of attacker
knowledge and progress knowledge from the previous section
are also ported to the new setting in a straightforward manner,
noting that the initial clock value is 0. However, we need a new
knowledge combinator, that we dub clock knowledge.
Definition 7 (Clock knowledge). Given a program c, initial
memory m, initial program counter level pc, and initial times-
tamp ts such that 〈c,m, pc | 0〉 −→∗t 〈c
′,m′, pc′ | ts ′〉, define
clock knowledge at level ℓadv to be the set of memoriesm
′ that
are consistent with the knowledge up to t followed further by
one more event with timestamp ts:
k→(c,m, t, ℓadv , ts) , {m
′ | m ∼ℓadv m
′
∧ 〈c,m′, pc | 0〉 −→∗t′ 〈c
′′,m′′, pc′′ | ts〉
∧ ⌊t′⌋ℓadv = ⌊t⌋ℓadv · (ts , α)}
Observe that the clock knowledge, the
progress knowledge, and the attacker knowl-
edge are related by their definitions as follows:
k(c,m, t, ℓadv)⊇ k→(c,m, t, ℓadv )⊇ k

→(c,m, t, ℓadv , ts
′).
We can now give a more precise top-level security condition:
Definition 8 (Timing-sensitive security with declassification
and locally-bound progress-insensitivity). Given a program c,
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initial memory m, initial program counter label pc, and initial
clock ts such that
〈c,m, pc | ts〉 −→∗t·(ts′,α) 〈c
′,m′, pc′ | ts ′〉
define the run as secure if it holds that for all ℓadv , if lev(α) ⊑
ℓadv then
1) if α = d(_, ℓauth , ℓto) then it should hold that:
a) k→(c,m, t, ℓadv , ts
′)⊇ k→(c,m, t, ℓadv)
⊇ k(c,m, t, ℓadv)
b) k(c,m, t · (ts ′, α), ℓadv ) ⊇ k(c,m, t, ℓauth ⊔ ℓto)
2) if α = t¯η(_, _) then it should hold that:
a) k(c,m, t · (ts ′, α), ℓadv ) ⊇ k

→(c,m, t, ℓadv , ts
′)
b) k→(c,m, t, ℓadv , ts
′) ⊇ k(c,m, t, ℓauth ⊔ ℓto)
3) otherwise it should hold that:
k(c,m, t · (ts ′, α), ℓadv ) ⊇ k(c,m, t, ℓadv)
Observe that Clause 3 of the above definition now requires
timing-sensitivity since it explicitly states that an attacker must
not learn anything from observing an event α and its timestamp.
Another notable change is Clause 1a that specifies that the tim-
ing of a regular declassification must not convey information.
Finally, this definition also changes the semantics of the tini-
construct (cf. Clause 2b). Instead of declassifying the progress
knowledge it now declassifies the timing behavior of the code
block guarded by tini.
The timing-sensitive security condition is connected to our
semantics through Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 (Soundness of the monitoring semantics for the
timing-sensitive security). Given a program c, memorym, level
pc, and timestamp ts then all runs 〈c,m, pc | ts〉 −→∗t
〈c′,m′, pc′ | ts ′〉 satisfy Definition 8.
V. DISCUSSION
a) Dimensions and principles of declassification: The re-
framing of the progress-insensitive security as declassification
allows us to think about it in terms of declassification principles
and dimensions. The locality-driven aspect of our definition
places it in a where dimension, while the use of authority-
based bounds naturally has a clear what flavor. While we do
not specify any bounds on what information can be learned via
a tini-declassification as long as the authority is sufficient, the
prior work on tight specification ofwhat information is released
through declassifications [4], [14] should compose with our
definition. Our authority model is inspired by the expressive
label models such as DLM [23] and FLAM [1]; and studying
our condition in the formal frameworks of these label models
will lead to who characterizations of the tini-declassifications.
Another interesting angle to explore is the integration of
integrity into the formal model, which would allow one to
study the robustness [32] of declassifications via progress-
insensitivity. Here, a potentially desirable semantic character-
ization is that attacker-controlled input does not influence in-
formation leaked through termination channels. A knowledge-
based approach to robustness [7] can provide a starting point
for such a definition.
With respect to the four principles of declassification, we
believe that the principles of semantic consistency – namely
that security definition should be invariant under equivalence-
preserving transformations – and of conservativity – namely
that the definition of security should be a weakening of nonin-
terference – follow directly from the knowledge-based nature
of the definition that is inherently attacker-driven [10]. The
principle of monotonicity of release – namely that adding a
declassification should not make a secure program insecure – is
also satisfied by our definition: adding a tini block to a program
that is already accepted by Definitions 5 does not change
how the definition treats this program, because all knowledge
containments for the declassification cases are weaker than
Clause 3 of the definition (a similar argument applies to the
normal declassification). Finally, our definition also satisfies the
non-occlusion principle – namely, that the presence of declassi-
fications should not mask other covert leaks. This one has two
subtleties. The first one is already discussed in Section III-C.
The second one is that without Clause 1a of the definition,
we would have violated non-occlusion, as examples that reach
an explicit declassification after a high loop would have been
accepted.
Similar arguments apply to Definition 8.
b) Design principle for pc-declassifications: In informa-
tion flow community, pc-declassifications have poor reputation
because their security is poorly understood. Our work provides
a principle for understanding security of pc-declassifications. In
other words, if a programming language or a system provides a
primitive for pc-declassification, how dangerous is it? The key
to this principle is bounding progress knowledge.
If security of pc-declassification can be characterized as a
bound on progress knowledge – as we do in Definition 5
– then these pc-declassifications are as dangerous as leaks
through progress. On the other hand, if progress knowledge
cannot be bounded, then these pc-declassifications are more
dangerous. For example, in a system designed to allow any pc-
declassifications, programs such as
if h then pcdecl(Hauth , L); l = 0 else pcdecl(Hauth , L); l = 1
can leak information indirectly more efficiently than just encod-
ing the secret in the length of the trace.
A similar argument applies to the clock knowledge.
c) Access control to authority: Neither our security pol-
icy nor the language provides guarantees about programs that
misuse authority if they have access to it. To that extent, our
approach leaves it to the programmers to ensure that untrusted
code does not have access to authority above the code’s in-
tended security clearance. However, the capability-based nature
of the authority means that a complementary technique for
principled control of capabilities can be used. One candidate
approach is the work by Dimoulas et al. [16] that uses access
control and integrity policies to restrict capability use. Another
is the mechanism of bounded privileges for LIO proposed by
Waye et al. [31].
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d) Enforcement techniques: We choose a simple runtime
monitor to showcase the enforcement of the new definition.
While the monitor is fully dynamic and flow-insensitive, we
believe that other single-trace monitoring techniques such as
hybrid information flow monitors [2], [19], [24] as well as
Denning-style static techniques can be easily adapted. Static
approaches may have an added benefit of helping infer the
location of tini statements. An interesting prospect for future
work is extension of monitors designed for declassification for
secure multi execution [22], [27] to enforce our definition.
e) Timing treatment: Our treatment of timing-sensitivity
in Section IV via a simple step counter is admittedly academic,
given the plethora of architectural and runtime side channels
today. We nevertheless believe that the formulation of the
timing-sensitive condition is useful, and can be combined with
other proposals to mitigate practical timing attacks such as
predictive mitigation [8], [34], [35].
VI. IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE
We implemented the tini-based enforcement as a part of a
functional programming language with dynamic information
flow control and actor-based concurrency. This language en-
forces progress-sensitive security, but allows tini-scoped initial-
ization as a variation of let-declarations
1 let tini auth (* tini declaration *)
2 val v1 = e1
3 val v2 = e2
4 ...
5 in (* the point of pcdecl *)
6 e
7 end
This construct declassifies the termination of the initialization
expressions e1, e2, ... using authority auth before evaluating the
body e.
Figure 7 presents a snippet from the code of the news widget
example in our language. The top listing is the source of the
news widget itself. When invoked with the favorite topic and
its current state as arguments, it updates the counter, fetching
updated news from the remote servers if necessary. Finally, it
returns the result together with the updated state. Fetching the
news is potentially blocking and implemented in the function
fetch_news (omitted from the listing but it uses the networking
primitives of the language). The news value is an associative
list, and the secret-dependent lookup is done using the built-
in function list_lookup_with_default. The initial state of the
widget is an empty list, with the counter set to zero. The security
level of the initial state is NEWS.
The bottom listing in the figure displays how this widget
is used by user at level ALICE. The important part is the
invocation of the news_widget is placed in the let tini block
with attenuated authority NEWS, which limits the termination
leakage of the news_widget function.
The actual example is about 80 lines of code. As another data
point for the readers, a different case study in our language of
roughly 500LOC uses the let tini construct 9 times.
1 fun news_widget fav state = =
2 let
3 val (news, update_counter) = state
4 val news = if update_counter %10 = 0
5 then fetch_news() (* Blocking *)
6 else news
7 val update_counter = update_counter + 1
8 (* Operation on the secret *)
9 val fav_news = list_lookup_with_default
10 news fav "no news"
11 in (fav_news, (news,update_counter))
12 end
13 val init_state = ([], 0) raisedTo {NEWS}
1 (* Receiving widget and initial state *)
2 val (news_widget, state0) = fetch_widget ()
3
4 (* Usage of the widget by user ALICE *)
5 val news_auth = attenuate(rootauth, {NEWS})
6 val fav_topic = "#politics" raisedTo {ALICE}
7
8 (* Calling untrusted widget code *)
9 val (fav_news1, state1) =
10 let tini news_auth
11 val res = news_widget fav_topic state0
12 in res
13 end
Fig. 7. News widget (top) and its usage (bottom) code snippets
VII. RELATED WORK
a) pc-declassification: Jif provides a mechanism for pc-
downgrading in the form of a declassify statement that lowers
that pc-label that is tracked by the type system. Unlike other
features of Jif that are proven sound, e.g., dependent labels [36]
or robust declassification [13], there is no soundness theorem
for the pc-declassifications.
Both the Asbestos [17] and the HiStar [33] operating systems
also allow downgrading of the control-flow. In Asbestos a
process with privilege, a related notion to our authority, can
decontaminate other processes’ send label which has the effect
of allowing the other process to “forget” that it has previously
seen secret data from the privileged process. In our setup, this
corresponds to passing an authority that allows declassifying
control-flow up to the senders level. HiStar similarly makes it
possible to lower the accrued taint by passing on untainting
gates that act as a capability for lowering the pc. Both of
these systems provide this functionality because it is a practical
feature to have, but neither of them presents a security condition
that encapsulates what this feature entails regarding leakage.
Chandra and Franz [12] present an information flow frame-
work for the Java Virtual Machine with a hybrid monitoring that
uses a static analysis to reason about when it is safe to declassify
the pc. Similarly to earlier work by, for example, Denning [15],
they statically find the immediate postdominator (the nearest
join-point that all execution paths must pass through) to any
branch-point and insert a pc-lowering command at this point.
Their security condition is intended to only allow lowering the
pc when no knowledge is revealed by doing so, but since they
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are in a setting where almost any bytecode can throw unchecked
exceptions, this is not generally feasible. Instead, they disregard
all implicit flows through unchecked exceptions and accept
these leaks as a limitation of the security the system provides.
We believe one could extend this line of work by applying our
bound on what is learned through such flows, and thereby gain
a stronger guarantee for the system as a whole.
The idea of control flow declassification also appears in the
discussions of information flow control vs. taint tracking. For
example, Schoepe et al. [29] use an observational approach
where every branch decision is declassified.
b) Knowledge-based policies: The methodology and the
experience of this paper is in line with the argument by Broberg
et al. [11] that epistemic specifications is the most natural way
to specify information flow properties:
The notion of security intrinsically has nothing to do
with observing two separate runs – but rather what
can be deduced from observing a single run. [. . . ] A
two-run formulation could certainly be very useful as
part of the strategy to prove e.g. the correctness of
an enforcement mechanism. [. . . ] But that property
is then only a stepping stone, and should, for com-
pleteness, be shown to imply the natural epistemic
property.
In our case, it is the operational security (cf. Lemma 2) that has
the two-run formulation.
The knowledge-based approach we use in this work follows
the style of definitions of gradual release [3]. Logical epistemic
approaches include the work by Halpern and O’Neill [18] that
use epistemic logic to specify noninterference, and that of Bal-
liu et al. [9] that uses epistemic temporal logic used to reason
about knowledge acquired by observing program outputs.
Chudnov and Naumann [14] define an epistemic seman-
tics for relational assumptions and guarantees in a progress-
insensitive setting. To specify the allowed knowledge at a
particular point in the trace they define a notion of release policy
of a trace, where relational assumptions are interpreted as an
annotation permitting the attacker to learn new information.
The insight of our work suggests the direction of lifting their
approach into a progress-sensitive setting and treating progress
leaks as another form of relational assumptions.
McCall et al. [22] propose a model for enforcing informa-
tion flow control in the setting of webpages that must handle
execution of untrusted scripts. Their approach enforces ro-
bust declassification such that untrusted code cannot influence
what is declassified by extending prior work on secure-multi-
execution. They show their enforcement sound with respect
to a knowledge-based progress-insensitive noninterference con-
dition with declassification. They also present a progress-
sensitive notion of noninterference, but restrict their focus to the
weaker progress-insensitive condition, because IO-operations
can use potentially looping event handlers that leak information
through progress (a design decision somewhat reminiscent of
the scenario in the Introduction). In the context of their work,
the bridge between progress-sensitive and progress-insensitive
security provided by our definition, can allow programmers
to explicitly state when, and how much, information an event
handler is allowed to leak through divergence.
c) Leakage via termination: Moore et al. [25] propose a
type-based enforcement combined with a runtime mechanism
for budgeting the amount of information leaked through ter-
mination at runtime. The idea is to use a termination oracle
that uses maximum available runtime public information to
deduce the termination behavior of secret-dependent code. The
budgets mechanism allows for a quantitative interpretation of
the leakage.
d) Untrusted code: LIO [30] and related programming
models side step the issue of label creep via a programming
discipline where high computations are forked into separate
processes. A consequence of this programming model however
is that consuming the result of the forked computation requires
process synchronization followed by explicit declassification.
Fabric [20] contains a number of mechanisms for confining
untrusted code downloaded over a network, including limits on
authority that the code can use and access labels that limit when
the untrusted code can read remote objects. As Fabric is based
on Jif, it also places timing and progress channels outside of its
threat model.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes two novel knowledge-based security
conditions that capture the semantic meaning of declassifying
the progress knowledge in information flow control systems.
While many language-based and architectural systems allows
such declassification there is, to the best of our knowledge, no
formal characterization of it. We present a language construct,
tini, that exactly captures the embedding of progress-insensitive
code in a stricter setting and show how this can be used in
the presence of potentially blocking or diverging untrusted
code. We furthermore show that our conditions are enforceable
by a mostly standard dynamic monitor. For future work we
conjecture that our epistemic definitions can form a foundation
for further studies by extending it with for example integrity and
robust downgrades, principled usage of authority-capabilities,
or more elaborate label models. Finally, we believe that a large
body of techniques that rely on progress-insensitive security can
use the insight of our work to accommodate stronger adversary
models.
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APPENDIX
The rest of this document serves to prove Theorem 1 (Soundness of the monitoring semantics) and
Theorem 2 (Soundness of the monitoring semantics for the timing-sensitive security). To do so, we first provide a few auxiliary
definitions and lemmas leading up to the proofs.
A. Well formed expressions
We restrict the occurrence of pcdeclη(ℓ1, ℓ2) such that the usage is well-bracketed w.r.t the operational semantics:
WF(pcdeclη(ℓ1, ℓ2))
c 6= c1; c2 pc_decl_free(c)
WF(c)
WF(c1) WF(c2)
WF(c1; c2)
Lemma 3 (Well formedness is preserved by the semantics). for any command c, if WF(c) and 〈c,m, pc〉 −→∗t 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉 then
WF(c′) holds.
Proof. Immediate by induction on c.
B. Indistinguishability relations
Definition 9 (Indistinguishability propagation by bridge). Given an indistinguishability relation I , define indistinguishability
propagation from configuration with command c and pc register pc, denoted [I]
c,pc
ℓ|α1...αn
to be the relation such that
m I s
m [I]c,pc
ℓ|nil s
m I s 〈c,m | s, pc〉 ⇒ℓα1...αk 〈c
′,m′ | s′, pc′′〉
m′ [I]c,pc
ℓ|α1...αk
s′
Lemma 4 (Preservation of ℓ-equivalence by bridge propagation). If I ⊆∼ℓ then [I]
c,pc
ℓ|α1...αk
⊆∼ℓ.
Proof. By induction on k. We examine the inductive case, as the base case is straightforward.
Considerm′, s′ such that m′ [I]c,pc
ℓ|α ⊆∼ℓ s
′. Unfolding the definitions, it must be that there are m and s such that m ∼ℓ s and
m I s. Since the bridge relations update the memories with the same ℓ-equivalent events, then it must be thatm′ ∼ℓ s
′.
Lemma 5 (Restriction monotonicity). 〈I〉
c,pc
ℓ|α ⊆ I .
Proof. Immediate from the definition of 〈·〉
c,pc
ℓ|α
Lemma 6 (Sequence decomposition). Suppose 〈c1; c2,m, pc〉y
n,ℓ
α 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉, then one of the following holds
1) 〈c1,m, pc〉y
n,ℓ
α 〈c
′
1,m
′, pc′〉 and c′ = c′1; c2
2) 〈c1,m, pc〉y
n1,ℓ
β 〈stop,m1, pc1〉 and 〈c2,m1, pc1〉y
n2,ℓ
α 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉 where n = n1 + n2 + 1 and β 6⊑ ℓ.
Proof. By inspection of the rules in the bridge relation and the associated rules of the operational semantics.
Lemma 7 (Equivalent runs are synchronized). If we have runs 〈c,m, pc〉 −→∗t 〈c1,m1, pc1〉 and 〈c, s, pc〉 −→
∗
t′ 〈c2, s2, pc2〉,
where the initial memories satisfy thatm ∼ℓ s and their traces are equal up to some level ℓ, ⌊t⌋ℓ = ⌊t
′⌋ℓ, then there exists c
′,m′,
s′, and pc′ such that
〈c,m | s, pc〉 ⇒ℓα1,α2,...,αk 〈c
′,m′ | s′, pc′〉
where ⌊t⌋ℓ = ⌊t
′⌋ℓ = [α1, α2, . . . , αk] andm
′ ∼ℓ m1 and s
′ ∼ℓ s1.
Proof. Follows from determinism of the operational semantics and the fact that observable events capture all observable changes
to memories.
Lemma 8 (Noninterference of expressions). Given an expression e and two memories m1 and m2 such that m1 ∼ℓ m2. If
〈e,m1〉 ⇓ 〈base1; ℓ1〉 and 〈e,m2〉 ⇓ 〈base2; ℓ2〉 then type(base1) = type(base2) and (ℓ1 ⊑ ℓ ∨ ℓ2 ⊑ ℓ) =⇒ (base1 =
base2 ∧ ℓ1 = ℓ2).
Proof. Straightforward induction on the evaluation rules.
Lemma 9 (Barring pcdecl commands, pc never decreases). Given a bridge-step 〈c,m, pc〉 yn,ℓα 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉 where pc 6⊑ ℓ and
pc_decl_free(c) then it holds that pc′ 6⊑ ℓ
Proof. Straightforward induction on the bridge-step relation.
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Lemma 10 (Observable (non-t¯(, ))-events are only emitted in low contexts). Given a bridge-step 〈c,m, pc〉 yn,ℓα 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉
where pc′ ⊑ ℓ and α is not an observable t¯(, )-event, it holds that pc ⊑ ℓ.
Proof. Straightforward induction on the bridge-step relation.
C. Proof of operational definition
Proof of Lemma 2: Given 〈c,m, pc〉yn,ℓα 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉, we proceed by induction in n.
For n = 0:
We have that 〈c,m, pc〉 y0,ℓα 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉 which, by inversion, entails that we must either have that c′ = stop and α 6⊑ ℓ
or that α ⊑ ℓ.
α ⊑ ℓ:
We have that α ⊑ ℓ so we have the following cases for α:
Case α = a(x, v):
Since c emits a(x, v) in a single evaluation step it must be the case that c is an assignment x = e where
〈e,m〉 ⇓ v. From Lemma 8 (Noninterference of expressions) we have that 〈e, s〉 ⇓ v so it follows trivially
that 〈c, s, pc〉y0,ℓ
a(x,v) 〈c
′, s′, pc′〉 wherem′ ∼ℓ s
′ which is what we need to prove.
Case α = d(x, ℓauth , ℓto):
Since c emits d(x, ℓauth , ℓto) in a single evaluation step it must be the case that c is a declassify command,
x = decl ev to ℓto with eauth , 〈ev,m〉 ⇓ 〈v; ℓfrom〉 and 〈eauth ,m〉 ⇓ 〈auth ℓauth 1; ℓ
′〉 . Furthermore, it
must be the case that ℓfrom ⊑ ℓauth ⊔ ℓto and ℓ
′ ⊑ pc.
We have two cases to show:
Case 1:
Suppose we have s such that s ∼ℓauth⊔ℓto m. We need to show that 〈x =
decl ev to ℓt with eauth , s, pc〉 y
0,ℓ
d(x,ℓauth ,ℓt)
〈c′, s′, pc′〉 and s′ ∼ℓ m
′ which follows from
applying Lemma 8 (Noninterference of expressions) on the evaluations of ev and ea.
Case 3:
Suppose we have s such that s ∼ℓ m. We need to show that 〈x =
decl ev to ℓt with eauth , s, pc〉y
0,ℓ
d(x,ℓauth ,ℓt)
〈c′, s′, pc′〉.
By Lemma 8 (Noninterference of expressions) we have that 〈eauth , s〉 ⇓ 〈auth ℓauth 1; ℓ
′〉 and by
completeness of expression evaluation we have that 〈ev,m〉 ⇓ 〈v
′; ℓfrom〉 so what we need follows
directly from the semantics of the language.
Case α = t¯η(ℓauth , ℓto):
Command cmust only consist of a pcdeclη(ℓauth , ℓto) and pc ⊑ ℓauth ⊔ℓto so it follows trivially that for any
s such that s ∼ℓauth⊔ℓto m we have that 〈pcdeclη(ℓauth , ℓto), s, pc〉y
0,ℓ
t¯η(ℓauth ,ℓto)
〈c′, s′, pc′〉 and s′ ∼ℓ m
′.
c′ = stop and α 6⊑ ℓ:
We have that c′ = stop and α 6⊑ ℓ. We have two cases based on whether or not pc′ ⊑ ℓ.
Case pc′ ⊑ ℓ:
It must also be the case that pc ⊑ ℓ, and it therefore easily follows that if s ∼ℓ m we also have that
〈c, s, pc〉y0,ℓα 〈stop, s
′, pc′〉, where s′ ∼ℓ m
′.
Case pc′ 6⊑ ℓ:
It must be that 〈c, s, pc〉y0,ℓα′ 〈c
′′, s′, pc′′〉. But since α is not observable neither is α′ so c′′ = stop. Similarly,
α′ cannot be emitted by a command that changed ℓ-parts of memory, so it also holds that s′ ∼ℓ m
′. Finally,
by examining the determinism of the operational semantics for ℓ-equivalent memories we get that pc′′ 6⊑ ℓ.
For n = k + 1:
We have 〈c,m, pc〉yk+1,ℓα 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉. We proceed by induction in c.
c is an assignment, declassify, or skip:
In all cases we get a contradiction since they all yield stop in a single step which would mean that k + 1 = 0.
c is sequence d1; d2:
We have four cases to prove:
If α = d(x, ℓfrom , ℓto) and α ⊑ ℓ:
We need to show Case 1 and Case 3.
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Proof of Case 1:
Let I =〈∼ℓauth⊔ℓto 〉
c,pc
ℓauth⊔ℓto|α1,...,αj
where
〈d1; d2,m, pc〉y
i1,ℓauth⊔ℓto
β1
〈c1,m1, pc1〉y
i2,ℓauth⊔ℓto
β2
. . . y
ij ,ℓauth⊔ℓto
βj
〈cj ,mj, pcj〉
y
i′,ℓauth⊔ℓto
d(x,ℓfrom ,ℓto)
〈c′,m′, pc′〉
such that i1+ . . .+ ij + j+ i
′ = k+1 and s such thatm I s be given. We now have two cases based
on j:
Case j is 0:
Since there are no events observable at level ℓauth ⊔ ℓto we have that
〈d1; d2,m, pc〉y
k+1,ℓauth⊔ℓto
d(x,ℓfrom ,ℓto)
〈c′,m′, pc′〉.
By applying Lemma 6 (Sequence decomposition) we have two cases:
α is produced by d1
We have 〈d1,m, pc〉y
k+1,ℓauth⊔ℓto
d(x,ℓfrom,ℓto)
〈d′1,m
′, pc′〉 and c′ = d′1; d2. We directly get what
we need by applying the inner induction hypothesis to this run.
α is produced by d2
We have
〈d1,m, pc〉y
k1,ℓauth⊔ℓto
β 〈stop,m1, pc1〉
and
〈d2,m1, pc1〉y
k2,ℓauth⊔ℓto
d(x,ℓfrom ,ℓto)
〈c′,m′, pc′〉
where β 6⊑ ℓauth⊔ℓto It follows from Lemma 10 (Observable (non-t¯(, ))-events are only emitted in low contexts)
that pc1 ⊑ ℓauth ⊔ ℓto so we can apply the induction hypothesis (with the attacker
level instantiated to ℓauth ⊔ ℓto) on the first bridge-step to obtain
〈d1, s, pc〉y
k1,ℓauth⊔ℓto
β′ 〈stop, s1, pc1〉
where m1 ∼ℓauth⊔ℓto s1 and using this we can apply the induction hypothesis to the
d2-run to obtain what we need.
Case j > 0:
From the definition of 〈∼ℓauth⊔ℓto 〉
c,pc
ℓauth⊔ℓto|β1,...,βj
we have that 〈c,m |
s, pc〉 ⇒ℓauth⊔ℓtoβ1...βj 〈cj ,mj | sj , pcj〉, and it therefore follows from
Lemma 4 (Preservation of ℓ-equivalence by bridge propagation) that mk ∼ℓauth⊔ℓto s
′. It
must be the case that i′ < k + 1 and we can therefore apply the induction hypothesis on
〈cj ,mj , pcj〉y
i′,ℓauth⊔ℓto
α 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉 to obtain what we need.
Proof of Case 3:
Suppose we are given s wherem ∼ℓ s. We need to show that
〈d1; d2, s, pc〉y
n′,ℓ
d(x,ℓfrom ,ℓto)
〈c′, s′, pc′〉
By applying Lemma Lemma 6 (Sequence decomposition) we have two cases based on whether or not
the event is produced by the first or second part of the sequential composition:
α is produced by d1
Then what we need follows directly from applying the inner induction hypothesis.
α is produced by d2
We have that
〈d1,m, pc〉y
k1,ℓ
β 〈stop,m1, pc1〉
and
〈d2,m1, pc1〉y
k2,ℓ
α 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉
where β 6⊑ ℓ. Since we end with a low program-counter, pc′ ⊑ ℓ, it follows from
Lemma 10 (Observable (non-t¯(, ))-events are only emitted in low contexts) that pc1 ⊑ ℓ.
Therefore, by applying the inner induction hypothesis on 〈d1,m, pc〉 y
k1,ℓ
β 〈stop,m1, pc1〉
we obtain run 〈d1, s, pc〉 y
k1,ℓ
β 〈stop, s1, pc1〉 such that m1 ∼ℓ s1. We can now apply
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the inner induction hypothesis on 〈d2,m1, pc1〉 y
k2,ℓ
α 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉 which gives us that
〈d2, s1, pc1〉y
k′′,ℓ
α 〈c
′, s′, pc′〉 andm′ ∼ℓ s
′ which is exactly what we need.
If α = t¯η(ℓauth , ℓto) and α ⊑ ℓ:
Let I =〈∼ℓauth⊔ℓto 〉
c,pc
ℓauth⊔ℓto |β1,...,βj
where
〈c,m, pc〉 yi1,ℓauth⊔ℓtoβ1 〈c1,m1, pc1〉 y
i2,ℓauth⊔ℓto
β2
. . . y
ij ,ℓauth⊔ℓto
βj
〈cj ,mj , pcj〉
and s such thatm I s be given. Similarly to the case above, we case on j; the number of intermediate events
that have become observable at the higher attacker-level:
Case j = 0:
We have that 〈d1; d2,m, pc〉 y
k+1,ℓauth⊔ℓto
t¯η(ℓauth ,pc′)
〈c′,m′, pc′〉 By applying
Lemma 6 (Sequence decomposition) we have two cases:
α is produced by d1
We have that
〈d1,m, pc〉y
k+1,ℓauth⊔ℓto
β 〈d
′
1,m
′, pc′〉
and c′ = d′1; d2, so we are done by aplying the inner induction hypothesis to this run.
α is produced by d2
We have
〈d1,m, pc〉y
k1,ℓauth⊔ℓto
β 〈stop,m1, pc1〉
and
〈d2,m1, pc1〉y
k2,ℓauth⊔ℓto
t¯η(ℓauth ,pc′)
〈c′,m′, pc′〉
where β 6⊑ ℓauth ⊔ ℓto . We know that pc
′ ⊑ ℓ so it must
also be the case that pc′ ⊑ ℓauth ⊔ ℓto . We can therefore apply
Lemma 10 (Observable (non-t¯(, ))-events are only emitted in low contexts) to obtain that
pc1 ⊑ ℓauth ⊔ ℓto . Hence we can apply the induction hypothesis on the first run to obtain
〈d1, s, pc〉y
k′
1
,ℓauth⊔ℓto
β′ 〈stop, s1, pc1〉
where s1 ∼ℓauth⊔ℓto m1. Which enables us to apply the induction hypothesis on the second run
and obtain
〈d2, s1, pc1〉y
k′
2
,ℓauth⊔ℓto
α′ 〈c
′, s′, pc′〉
where s′ ∼ℓauth⊔ℓto m
′. It directly follows that s′ ∼ℓ m
′ as well and furthermore we can
combine the two runs above to obtain
〈d1; d2, s, pc〉y
k′,ℓ
α′ 〈c
′, s′, pc′〉
as needed.
Case k > 0:
From the definition of 〈∼ℓauth⊔ℓto 〉
c,pc
ℓauth⊔ℓto |α1,...,αk
we have that there exists
〈c,m | s, pc〉 ⇒ℓβ1...βj 〈cj ,mj | sj , pcj〉
and furthermore we have that
〈cj ,mj, pcj〉y
i′,ℓauth⊔ℓto
t¯η(ℓauth ,ℓto)
〈c′,m′, pc′〉
Since k > 0 it must be the case that i′ < k + 1 and since I ⊆ (∼ℓauth⊔ℓto ) we get
by Lemma 4 (Preservation of ℓ-equivalence by bridge propagation) that [I]
c,pc
ℓ|β1...βj
⊆ (∼ℓauth⊔ℓto).
Hence, since m I s we have that m ∼ℓauth⊔ℓto s and finally from that we obtain that m [I]
c,pc
ℓ|β1...βj
s.
This enables us to conclude thatmj ∼ℓauth⊔ℓto sj and we can therefore apply the induction hypothesis
to
〈cj ,mj, pcj〉y
i,ℓauth⊔ℓto
t¯η(ℓauth ,ℓto)
〈c′,m′, pc′〉
to obtain what we need.
If α 6= t¯(, ) and pc′ ⊑ ℓ:
Suppose we are given s such that m ∼ℓ s. We need to show that there exists run 〈d1; d2, s, pc〉 y
k′,ℓ
α
〈c′, s′, pc′〉 and, if α is not an observable declassify event, thatm′ ∼ℓ s
′.
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By applying Lemma 6 (Sequence decomposition) we have two cases:
α is produced by d1
Then what we need follows directly from applying the inner induction hypothesis.
α is produced by d2
We then have that
〈d1,m, pc〉y
k1,ℓ
β 〈stop,m1, pc1〉
and
〈d2,m1, pc1〉y
k2,ℓ
α 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉
where β 6⊑ ℓ. Since we end with a low program-counter, pc′ ⊑ ℓ, it follows from
Lemma 10 (Observable (non-t¯(, ))-events are only emitted in low contexts) that pc1 ⊑ ℓ. Therefore,
by applying the inner induction hypothesis on 〈d1,m, pc〉 y
k1,ℓ
β 〈stop,m1, pc1〉 we obtain run
〈d1, s, pc〉 y
k1,ℓ
β 〈stop, s1, pc1〉 such that m1 ∼ℓ s1. This further entails that m1 I s1 so
by applying the inner induction hypothesis on 〈d2,m1, pc1〉 y
k2,ℓ
α 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉 we obtain that
〈d2, s1, pc1〉y
k′′,ℓ
α 〈c
′, s′, pc′〉 andm′ ∼ℓ s
′ which is exactly what we need.
If α = t¯η(ℓauth , ℓto) or pc
′ 6⊑ ℓ:
We are given run 〈d1; d2, s, pc〉 y
k′,ℓ
α′ 〈c
′′, s′, pc′′〉 such that m ∼ℓ s. Then either it must be the case that
α 6⊑ ℓ or α = t¯η(ℓauth , ℓto):
α 6⊑ ℓ:
It then follows that the finals memories must be related (since none of the run emit any observable
events) and that pc′′ 6⊑ ℓ.
α = t¯η(ℓauth , ℓto):
We then have that α′ must also be t¯η(ℓauth , ℓto) since otherwise it would have to be an unobservable
event and c′′ would have to be stop, which leads to a contradiction since WF(d1; d2) holds and
therefore the run in s cannot “step over” the pcdecl command. It then also follows thatm′ ∼ℓ s
′ since
both runs only emit unobservable events up to the t¯η(ℓauth , ℓto) event and the commands c
′ and c′′
must be the same.
c is conditional if e then ct else ce:
Suppose 〈e,m〉 ⇓ 〈base ; ℓv〉. We consider two cases based on whether or not ℓv ⊑ ℓ.
1) If it does, we know that for any memory s such thatm ∼ℓ s, it holds that 〈e, s〉 ⇓ 〈base; ℓv〉. Hence, any other
memory will also be able to step, and it will step to the same branch. From there, we are done by applying the
inner induction hypothesis.
2) If it doesn’t, we know that after stepping to one of the branches, the program-counter will be pc ⊔ ℓv for which
it holds that ℓ 6⊑ pc ⊔ ℓv. Now since we know thatWF(c) holds, we know that the pc cannot go down in either
branch, so we can apply Lemma 9 to conclude that pc′ 6⊑ ℓ. Hence we know that c′ = stop and are given s such
thatm ∼ℓ s. We need to show
〈if e then ct else ce, s, pc〉 y
k+1,ℓ
α′ 〈c
′′, s′, pc′′〉 =⇒ c′ = c′′ = stop ∧m′ ∼ℓ s
′ ∧ α′ 6⊑ ℓ
which follows directly by applying the inner induction hypothesis to either of the branches that the run may step
to.
c is while e do cb:
Follows from unfolding a single evaluation step and applying what we know about if e then cb else skip and
sequences.
c is tiniη to ℓto with eauth do cb:
Follows from unfolding a single evaluation step and applying what we know about sequences.
c is eval e {x1, . . . , xn}:
By unfolding a single evaluation step we obtain that e evaluates to a string that can be parsed as a command c. Now
the reasoning is exactly the same as for conditionals if then else since we are either in a case where e is a “low”
value and then any other memory will produce the same string and otherwise we are stepping to a “high” pc and we
can again reason in the same fashion as for conditionals.
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D. Proof of top-level definitions
a) Proof of soundness for progress-sensitive NI with declassification and bounded PINI: We are now in position to prove
Theorem 1: Suppose we have an attacker at level ℓ and a run
〈c,m, pc〉 −→∗t·α 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉
where lev(α) ⊑ ℓ.
Suppose ⌊t⌋ℓ = β1, β2, . . . , βn: Then it must be the case that
〈c,m, pc〉yi1,ℓβ1 〈c1,m1, pc1〉y
i2,ℓ
β2
. . . y
in,ℓ
βn
〈cn,mn, pcn〉y
i,ℓ
α 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉
We have three cases to show:
α is d(x, ℓfrom , ℓto):
We need to show 2 conditions:
k→(c,m, t, ℓ) ⊇ k(c,m, t, ℓ) (1)
k(c,m, t · α, ℓ) ⊇ k(c,m, t, ℓauth ⊔ ℓto) (2)
k→(c,m, t, ℓ) ⊇ k(c,m, t, ℓ):
To show Condition 1, suppose s ∈ k(c,m, t, ℓ). By unfolding the knowledge definition, this
entails that 〈c, s, pc〉 −→∗t′ 〈c
′′, s′′, pc′′〉 where ⌊t′⌋ℓ = ⌊t⌋ℓ and m ∼ℓ s. So using
Lemma 7 (Equivalent runs are synchronized) we have that
〈c,m | s, pc〉 ⇒ℓβ1,β2,...,βn 〈cn,mn | sn, pcn〉
Which we can use to conclude thatm [∼ℓ]
c,pc
ℓ|β1,...βn
s, so by Lemma 4 (Preservation of ℓ-equivalence by bridge propagation)
we have thatmn ∼ℓ sn.
We need to show that s ∈ k→(c,m, t, ℓ), which now amounts to showing
〈cn, sn, pcn〉y
j,d(x,ℓfrom ,ℓto)
ℓ 〈c
′, s′, pc′〉
Now, it must be the case that pc′ ⊑ ℓ (since d(x, ℓfrom , ℓto) is observable), so this follows directly from Case 3 of
Lemma 2 (Security for monitored evaluations).
k(c,m, t · α, ℓ) ⊇ k(c,m, t, ℓauth ⊔ ℓto):
To show Condition 2, suppose s ∈ k(c,m, t, ℓauth ⊔ ℓto). By unfolding the knowledge definition, this
entails that 〈c, s, pc〉 −→∗t′ 〈c
′′, s′, pc′′〉 where ⌊t′⌋ℓauth⊔ℓto = ⌊t⌋ℓ and m ∼ℓauth⊔ℓto s. So using
Lemma 7 (Equivalent runs are synchronized) we have that
〈c,m | s, pc〉 ⇒ℓβ1,β2,...,βn 〈cn,mn | sn, pcn〉
where 〈cn,mn, pcn〉y
i,d(x,ℓfrom ,ℓto)
ℓ 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉
We then need to show that s ∈ k(c,m, t · α, ℓ), which now amounts to showing
〈cn, sn, pcn〉y
m,ℓ
d(x,ℓfrom ,ℓto)
〈c′, s′, pc′〉
wherem′ ∼ℓ s
′.
We have that m ∼ℓauth⊔ℓto s so from the synchronized bridge above it follows that mk [(∼ℓauth⊔ℓto )]
c,pc
ℓauth⊔ℓto|β1...βj
sk. Using Lemma 4 (Preservation of ℓ-equivalence by bridge propagation) we can also conclude that
[(∼ℓauth⊔ℓto )]
c,pc
ℓauth⊔ℓto |β1...βj
⊆ (∼ℓauth⊔ℓto ), so it must be the case that mj ∼ℓauth⊔ℓto sj . Now we can obtain
exactly what we need from Case 1 of Lemma 2 (Security for monitored evaluations).
α is t¯η(., .):
We need to show that two conditions:
k(c,m, t · α, ℓ) ⊇ k→(c,m, t, ℓ) (3)
k→(c,m, t, ℓ) ⊇ k(c,m, t, ℓauth ⊔ ℓto) (4)
k(c,m, t · α, ℓ) ⊇ k→(c,m, t, ℓ):
To show Condition (3), suppose s ∈ k→(c,m, t, ℓ). By unfolding the definition of progress knowledge we therefore
have that 〈c, s, pc〉 −→∗t′ 〈c
′′, s′, pc′′〉where ⌊t′⌋ℓ = ⌊t⌋ℓ ·α
′ for some α′ and thatm ∼ℓ s. We need to show that s ∈
k(c,m, t · α, ℓ), which amounts to showing that α = α′. Now since we know that α is a public event, we know that
pc ′ ⊑ ℓ and hence we obtain what we need from Case 4 of applying Lemma 2 (Security for monitored evaluations).
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k→(c,m, t, ℓ) ⊇ k(c,m, t, ℓauth ⊔ ℓto):
To show Condition (4), suppose s ∈ k(c,m, t, ℓ ⊔ ℓauth ⊔ ℓto). By unfolding the definition of knowledge
this entails that 〈c, s, pc〉 −→∗t′ 〈c
′′, s′, pc′′〉 where ⌊t′⌋ℓauth⊔ℓto = ⌊t⌋ℓauth⊔ℓto and m ∼ℓauth⊔ℓto s. So using
Lemma 7 (Equivalent runs are synchronized) we have that
〈c,m | s, pc〉 ⇒ℓβ1,β2,...,βn 〈cn,mn | sn, pcn〉
where 〈cn,mn, pcn〉 y
i,t¯η(ℓauth ,ℓto)
ℓ 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉 We need to show that s ∈ k→(c,m, t, ℓ) which now amounts to
showing that there exists α′ such that
〈cj , sj , pcj〉y
m,ℓ
α′ 〈c
′′, s′, pc′′〉
where m′ ∼ℓ s
′. We have that m ∼ℓauth⊔ℓto s so from the synchronized bridge above it follows that
mn [(∼ℓauth⊔ℓto )]
c,pc
ℓauth⊔ℓto|β1,...,βn
sn. Using Lemma 4 (Preservation of ℓ-equivalence by bridge propagation) we
can also conclude that [(∼ℓauth⊔ℓto )]
c,pc
ℓauth⊔ℓto|β1...βj
⊆ (∼ℓauth⊔ℓto ), so it must be the case that mj ∼ℓauth⊔ℓto
sj . Again, we are now in a position to obtain exactly what we need from Case 2 of applying
Lemma 2 (Security for monitored evaluations).
Otherwise:
We need to show
k(c,m, t · α, ℓ) ⊇ k(c,m, t, ℓ)
So suppose s ∈ k(c,m, t, ℓ). This entails that there exists run such that 〈c, s, pc〉 −→∗t′ 〈c
′′, s′′, pc′′〉 where ⌊t′⌋ℓ = ⌊t⌋ℓ.
Again, using Lemma 7 (Equivalent runs are synchronized) we can conclude that
〈c,m | s, pc〉 ⇒ℓβ1,β2,...,βn 〈cn,mn | sn, pcn〉
such that
〈cn,mn, pcn〉y
i,ℓ
α 〈c
′,m′, pc′〉
which we can use to conclude thatm [∼ℓ]
c,pc
ℓ|β1,...βn
s, so by Lemma 4 (Preservation of ℓ-equivalence by bridge propagation)
we have thatmn ∼ℓ sn.
We need to show that s ∈ k(c,m, t · α, ℓ) which amounts to showing that
〈ck, sk, pck〉y
m′,ℓ
α 〈c
′, s′, pc′〉
Now since we know that α ⊑ ℓ, we know that pc′ ⊑ ℓ. Hence we can conclude what we need from Case 3 of applying
Lemma 2 (Security for monitored evaluations).
b) Proof of soundness for timing-sensitive NI with declassification and bounded PINI: The proof of Theorem 2 follows
exactly the same structure as the proof of Theorem 1. Since we sync up the runs on equivalent runs, and the events carry the
timestamp, we get what we need from the operational definition proved in Lemma 2.
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